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to ban creation of new kinds and systems of USA approach to such questions as settlement in much attention, in his striving to conclude an
weapons of mass destruction, to ban chemical the Near East or improvement in the sphere of agreement without long negotiations on remain-
weapons, and to conclude a world treaty on non- trade-economic relations between our countries, ing contradictory questions, thinking that these
use of force. Our proposals on this and some which could bear witness to an intention to move questions can be put off for  later. I told him that
other questions, including that of the Indian to their successful settlement. it is not so, but... (Vance waved his hands to
Ocean, were presented many times and con- And finally. In the letter the question of so indicate that he did not manage to persuade the
cretely, in particular, in the United Nations. called  human rights is raised again. Our quali- President that he was right).
Keeping in mind the interests of international fication of the essence of this matter and of the I hope that the direct letter from L.I.
security and strengthening of peace, we could behavior of American Administration in this re- Brezhnev, Vance went on, will make the Presi-
also discuss questions raised in your letter, such spect has just been reported through our Ambas- dent look at the situation in a somewhat different
as: warning of missile launch tests, reduction of sador. This is our principle position. We have no way.
selling and supply of conventional weapons to intention to enforce our customs on your country I, of course, do not fully agree with what is
the  third world countries, and others. or other countries, but we will not allow interfer- written in the letter, but I hope that it is this kind
We give much importance to the agreement ence in our internal affairs, no matter what kind of of letter that the President needs to receive
on reduction of armed forces and weapons in pseudo-humane pretence is used for the purpose. now. 4(...)
Central Europe without prejudice to the security We will firmly react to any attempts of this kind.
of any of the sides. And how should we treat such a situation, The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA
Yet a one-sided approach is evident as far as when the President of the USA sends a letter to (signature)
your letter and negotiations in Vienna are con- the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and at the
cerned. This is the only way to treat, for example, same time starts the correspondence with a ren- /A. Dobrynin/
the statements that the American side views its egade, who proclaimed himself to be an enemy of
positions in regard to the Vienna negotiations the Soviet State and who stands against normal, [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives,
with the air of some kind of  concern with good relations between the USSR and the USA?3 Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]
excessive increase of military power in East We would not like our patience to be tested while
Europe. Not only is an objective evaluation of dealing with any matters of foreign policy, in- * * * * *
the real situation missing here, but also the con- cluding the questions of Soviet-American rela-
structive proposals, which were put forward by tions. The Soviet Union must not be dealt with Carter s Letter to Brezhnev, March 4, 1977
the USSR and other countries-participants in the like that.
negotiations and directed at achieving progress These are the thoughts, Mr.President, which Embassy of the USSR in the USA
at the Vienna negotiations, are completely ig- my colleagues and I had in connection with your Top secret
nored. We are ready now and in the future for a letter. I did not choose smooth phrases, though Copy No. 1
search for solutions and outcomes, a search which they might have been more pleasant. The things Washington, D.C.
does not imply that someone will receive unilat- we talk about are too serious to leave space for
eral advantages. But if we are expected to any kind of ambiguity or reticence. From the Journal
unilaterally reduce our defensive capabilities My letter is a product of sincere concern of DOBRYNIN, A.F.
and thus put ourselves and our allies into an about the present and future of our relations, and
unequal position, such expectations will lead it is this main idea that I want with all directness
nowhere. and trust to bring to you. RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION
It is impossible to agree with the evaluation I hope that with an understanding of the
of the situation relating to fulfillment of the Four- elevated responsibility which is placed on the with Z. BRZEZINSKI
power agreement which is given in the letter. leadership of our two countries we will be able to
The USSR never encroached and does not en- provide the forward development of Soviet-
croach now on the special status of Western American relations along the way of peace, in the March 5, 1977
Berlin, and the appeal for support in lifting ten- interests of our and all other people.
sion in that region is directed to the wrong This morning Brzezinski handed me (Vance was
address. The fact that complications still arise With respect, away) the text of President Carter s letter to L.I.
there is connected with the completely definite Brezhnev of March 4, 1977.
policy carried out by the FRG with the conniv- L. Brezhnev
ance of three western states, and is which is  To His Excellency
practically directed at dissolving the Four-pow- February 25, 1977 Leonid I. Brezhnev
ers treaty and its cornerstone resolution that General Secretary
West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and Vance read the text of the letter attentively of the Central Committee
cannot be governed by it. But the attempts to twice and then said the following. of the Communist Party
break this resolution are a very slippery path of the Soviet Union [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]